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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. 78-2-2 (3) (a) (1996).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

The Stipulation was signed under significant Duress and the order thereon

should be set aside by the court.
Utah law is clear that a party may invalidate a contract where there is a
showing that a party committed a harmful act which put another party in fear such as to
compel him to act against his will. Heglar Ranch, Inc, vs. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390
(Utah 1980). That ruling is derived from an earlier Utah case that offers the rule that
"any wrongful act or threat which actually puts the victim in such fear as to compel him
to act against his will constitutes duress" which will invalidate a contract. Fox vs.
Piercev. 227 P.2d 763 (Utah 1951V
The Fox case, supra, designates three parameters for the consideration of
the invalidation of a contract which include:
(1) that the other contracting party committed a wrongful act;
(2) which put the initial party in fear;
(3) such as to compel him to act against his will.
(4) such as to compel him to act against his will.
Other Pacific Coast jurisdictions help to embellish upon the application
of the former stated common law rule accepted and applied in Utah.
Regarding the state of mind of the victim of duress it is stated in Wiesen
vs. Short, 604 P.2d 1191 (Colo 1979), "to establish duress as a ground for avoidance
of a contract.. .it must clearly appear that force or threats employed actually subjugated
the mind and will of the person against whom they were directed, and were thus the sole
and efficient cause of action which he took". It could not be any more clear than
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plaintiff gave completely beyond what may have reasonably been expected because she
was totally subjected to the will of the defendant which was the sole cause of her action.
The threat of duress against plaintiff herein was that she had to give up
everything, her judgment, her claim for return of a vehicle, her payment for a debt of
defendant, her personal property, nearly everything she had to obtain the agreement to
dismiss the Protective Order. Further, it was the only reasonable alternative.
The party being compelled to assent against his will must be faced with it
as the only reasonable alternative for the doctrine of duress to remedy. Frank Culver
Elec, Inc. vs. Jorgenson, 664 P.2d 226, (Ariz. 1983).
Courts will not enforce a bargain where one party has unconscionably
taken advantage of the distress of the other. Inman vs. Clyde Hall Drilling Co., 369 P 2d
498, (Alaska 1962), 4 A.L.R. 3d 430. It is reasonable to assume a person in jail is in
distress. Plaintiff also faced the necessity of obtaining freedom to care for her daughter
who was seriously ill.
With regard to the wrongful act requirement of the remedy of the doctrine
of duress offers, an act or threat constitutes duress of it is wrongful and places party
entering into transaction in such fear as to preclude the exercise by him of free will and
Judgment. Dunbar vs. Dunbar, 429 P.2d 949, (Ariz. 1967). The requirement of a
wrongful act may be met if it is wrongful in the moral sense. Totem Marine Tug
& Barge, Inc. vs. Alyseka Pipeline Service Co., 584 P.2d 15, (Alaska 1978) 9 A.L.R.
4th 928.

4

For Plaintiff to be required to give all that she was required to give to
obtain her freedom was a moral wrong by the defendant. He knew her plight and
obtained extreme advantage over her for it. The consideration he paid by dismissing the
Protective Order was minute and totally inadequate in comparison to what he required
of plaintiff for his act requiring no cost whatsoever.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

The Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations, whose
Interpretation is determinative in the instant appeal, are set out verbatim, with the
Appropriate citation in the body and arguments of the instant brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Plaintiff filed this matter for the pursuit of return of vehicle owned by

plaintiff, namely a 1992 Lexus SC400 vehicle.
2.

Subsequent to the filing of complaint and answer in the above matter

circumstances completely changed causing that this plaintiff gave over title and interest
in and to the subject vehicle pursuant to Stipulation on file herein. Said Stipulation also
designated the transfer of other personal property and rights to be given to the defendant
as set forth hereafter.
3.

The Stipulation agreed that plaintiff s judgment against defendant in small

claims court, Civil No., 994004279SC, allowing recovery of rents and other damages to
plaintiff in the amount of $5,071.00 with interest be completely dismissed with prejudice
in favor of defendant. (See plaintiffs exhibit "A" attached hereto Plaintiffs Affidavit).
4.

A previously disputed matter of debts between the parties, potentially a

litigation matter for small claims regarding the amount of $1,400.00 was Stipulated in
favor of defendant and plaintiff agreed to pay the amount to defendant by March 31,
2000.
5.

The Stipulation allows that the plaintiff without further consideration shall

turn over the defendant personal property owned and in the possession of plaintiff,
much of the personal property enumerated was owned or received by plaintiff as a
gift and was the personal property of defendant.
6.

The circumstances that caused plaintiff no alternative to commit to such

a Stipulation was that plaintiff was sentenced to a short jail term of a few months for
involvment in a criminal matter pending before the above entitled court. Defendant was

allowed to be free from imposition of the subject criminal sentence of the court except
there existed a Protective Order obtained by defendant that required dismissal before
plaintiff could befreedfromthe jail sentence.
7.

At the same time the jail sentence was imposed plaintiffs daughter was

seriously ill and with no one to care for her except the plaintiff herein.
8.

Therefore two compelling reasons existed for plaintiff to secure the

dismissal of defendant's Protective Order against plaintiff at any cost. There was no
alternative.
9.

After the Stipulation and Order of this Court was entered defendant

dismissed the Protective Order pursuant to the agreement. (See plaintiffs Exhibit B
attached hereto to Plaintiffs Affidavit).
10.

Release of the plaintiff from jail was effective thereafter, (see Exhibit

"C" attached hereto to Plaintiffs Affidavit).
11.

The plaintiff first approached defendant about a dismissal of his

Protective Order after she had been incarcerated. Plaintiff explained to defendant that
she could obtain release if his Protective Order was dismissed. Plaintiff also explained
the reasons why she needed release. Plaintiff was desperate to provide help to her
daughter besides the fact that she could be freed from incarceration if the Protective
Order was dismissed.
12.

The defendant found this as his opportunity to resolve all pending matters

of personal property disputes that had arisen between the parties while they were
co-habitating. The defendant had lost the small claims matter and was bound to lose
the matter filed herein after the ownership of the subject vehicle.

13.

The plaintiff had supported defendant for a lengthy period of time and did

not owe the $1,400.00 debt plaintiff agreed to pay for the defendant.
14.

The defendant further demanded nearly all of the personal property owned

by plaintiff which defendant had absolutely no right or title to whatsoever to finally agree
to dismiss his Protective Order.
15.

The plaintiff had no choice but to agree even though the bargain the

defendant struck was morally wrong.
16.

The above-entitled matter came before the court on June 20,2000, the

Plaintiff was represented by her counsel Rex B. Bushman and Defendant Mariusz
Bienkowski was represented by, his counsel J. Kent Holland. After hearing and good
Cause showing regard the matter it is hereby ordered that the Motion was Denied on
June 29, 2000.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff filed this matter for the pursuit of return of vehicle owned by

plaintiff, namely, a 1992 Lexus SC400 vehicle.
2.

Subsequent to the filing of the complaint and answer in the above matter

circumstances completely changed causing that this plaintiff gave over title and interest
in and to the subject vehicle pursuant to Stipulation on file herein. Said Stipulation also
designated the transfer of other personal property and rights to be given to the defendant
has set forth hereafter.
3.

The Stipulation agreed that plaintiff s judgment against defendant in small

claims court, Civil No. 994004279SC, allowing recovery of rents and other damages to
plaintiff in the amount of $5071.00 with interest be completely dismissed with prejudice
in favor of defendant. (See plaintiffs exhibit "A" attached hereto to Plaintiffs Affidavit).
4.

A previously disputed matter of debts between the parties, potentially a

litigation matter for small claims regarding the amount of $1,400.00, was Stipulated in
favor of defendant and plaintiff agreed to pay the amount to defendant by March 31,
2000. If payment is not made the Stipulation allows for judgment in that amount to be
entered against plaintiff.(See Stipulation on file herein).

5.

The Stipulation allows that plaintiff without further consideration shall

turn over to the defendant personal property owned or in possession of plaintiff.
Much of the personal property enumerated was owned or received by plaintiff as a
Gift, or payment on funds owned and was never the personal property of defendant.
(See Stipulation on file herein).

6.

Attorney fees to enforce the Stipulation were allowed to defendant.

7.

The circumstances that caused plaintiff no alternative to commit such a

Stipulation were that plaintiff was sentenced to a short jail term of three months for
involvement in a criminal matter pending before the above entitled Court. Defendant
was allowed to be free from imposition of the subject criminal sentence of the court
except that there existed a Protective Order obtained by defendant that required dismissal
before plaintiff could be freed from the jail sentence.
8.

At the same time the jail sentence was imposed plaintiffs daughter was

seriously ill and with no one to care for except the plaintiff herein.
9.

Therefore two compelling reasons existed for plaintiff to secure the

Dismissal of defendant's Protective Order against plaintiff at any cost. There was no
Alternative.
10.

After the Stipulation and Order of this Court was entered defendant

dismissed the Protective Order pursuant to the agreement. (See plaintiffs Exhibit "B"
attached hereto to Plaintiffs Affidavit).
11.

Release of the plaintiff from jail was effective thereafter. (See Exhibit

"C" attached hereto to Plaintiffs Affidavit).
12.

The plaintiff first approached defendant about a dismissal of his Protective

Order after she had been incarcerated. Plaintiff explained to the defendant that she could
obtain release if both Protective Orders were dismissed, (his and hers) Plaintiff also
explained the reasons why she needed released aside from the fact that she did not enjoy
being incarcerated. Plaintiff was desperate to provide help to her daughter besides the
fact that she could be freed from incarceration if the Protective Order was dismissed.

13.

The defendant found this as his opportunity to resolve all pending matters

of personal property disputes that had arisen between the parties while they were cohabitating. The defendant had lost the small claims matter and was bound to lose the
matter filed herein over the ownership of the subject vehicle.
14.

The plaintiff had supported defendant for a lengthy period of time and did

not owe the $1,400.00 debt plaintiff agreed to pay for defendant.
15.

The defendant further demanded nearly all of the personal property owned

by plaintiff which defendant had absolutely no right or title to whasoever to finally agree
to dismiss his Protective Order.
16.

The plaintiff had no choice but to agree even though the bargain the

Defendant struck was morally wrong.
17.

Given that plaintiff has no further desire to communicate in any way with

Defendant there is no possibility of a further Protective Order against her and the jail
Term is now over with no further threat of plaintiff s incarceration. (See Plaintiffs
Affidavit attached hereto for all facts stated herebefore).

ARGUMENT
L

THE STIPULATION WAS SIGNED UNDER SIGNIFICANT DURESS

AND THE ORDER THEREON SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BY THE COURT.
Utah law is clear that a party may invalidate a contract where there
is a showing tl lat a party committed a harmful i- '

:;.•!.. ^arty in fear such

as to compel him to act against his will. Heglar Ranch, Inc. vs. Stillman, 619 P .2d
1390 (Utah 1980). That ruling is derived from an earlier Utah case that offers the
rule that "any wrongful act or threat which actually puts the victim ii I si ich feai as to
compel him to act against his will constitutes duress" which will invalidate a contract.
Fox vs. Pericey, 227 P 2d 763 (Utah 1951).
The Fox case, supra, designates three parameters for the consideration of the
invalidation of a contract which include:
(1) That the other contracting party committed a wrongful act:
(2) which put the initial party in fear;
(3) such as to compel him to act against his will.
other Pacific Coast jurisdictions help to embellish upon the application of the
former stated common law rule accepted and applied in Utah. Regarding the state of
mind of the victim of duress it is stated in Wiesen vs. Short, 604 P. 2d 1191 (Colo
1979), "to establish duress as a ground for avoidance of a contract.... It must clearly
appear that force or threats employed actually subjugated the mind and will of the
person against whom they directed, and were thus the sole and efficient cause of
action which he took". It could not be any more clear than plaintiff gave completely
beyond what may have reasonably been expected because she was totally subjected

to the will of the defendant which was the sole cause of her action.
The threat of duress against plaintiff herein was that she had to give up
everything, Iini lud^nu'iil, ha n'l.iiiii lor icliiii'ii of a vdiiH Ilk", liei payment tl a
debt of defendant, her personal property, nearly everything she had to obtain the
agreement to dismiss the Protective Order. Further, it was the only reasonable
alternative.
The party being compelled to assent against his will must be faced with it
as the only reasonable alternative for the doctrine of di iress to remedy I'rank
Culver Elec, Inc. vs. Jorgenson, 664 P2d 226, (Ariz. 1983)
courts will not enforce a bargain where one party was unconscionably taken advantage
of the distress of the other. Inman vs. Clyde Hall Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 498,
(Alaska 1962), 4 A.L.R. 3d 430. It is reasonable to assume a person in jail is in
distress. Plaintff also faced the necessity of obtaining freedom to care for her daughter
who was seriously ill.
With regard to the wrongful act requirement of the remedy the doctrine of duress
offers, an act or threat constitutes duress of it is wrongful and places party entering into
transactions in such fear as to preclude the exercise by him of free will and judgment.
Dunbar vs. Dunbar, 429 P.2d 949, (Ariz. 1967) The requirement of a wrongful act
may be met if it is wrongful in the moral sense. Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc.
Vs. Alyseka Pipeline Service Co., 584 P.2d 15, (Alaska 1978) 9 A.L.R. 4th 928.
For plaintiff to be required to give all that she required to give to obtain her
freedom was a moral wrong by the defendant. He knew her plight and obtained extreme
advantage over her for it. The consideration he paid by dismissing the Protective Order

was minute and totally inadequate in comparison to what he required of plaintiff for his
act requiring no cost whatsoever.

CONCLUSION

of Appeals Decision, and remand the case for the entry of orders or proceedings
consistent with this Court's instructions set forth in it's Opinion.
Plaintiff has met all conditions under Utah law of Fox vs. Piercey, 227 P 2d 763
(Utah 1951) to be relieved of the subject stipulation and order herein by way the
the doctrine of duress. The doctrine of duress allows avoidance of the stipulation entered
into between the parties and the setting aside of the court order entered thereon.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of Decembei , 2000.

44Q/TU
OCL

/OHf^i^fA.

Linda Munford, Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief
To the following counsel, postage prepaid and by U.S. Mail, this
Of December, 2000:
Bradley J. Schofield
Anderson & Holland
623 East First South
P.O.Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643
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/ 0

Rex B. Bushman, Esq. #0521
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
115 E. Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-8020
Facsimile: (801) 533-8877
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LINDA MUNFORD,

:

Plaintiff,

: PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT

vs .
MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI,

: Civil No. 990906380

Defendant.

: Judge GJjenn K. Twasaki

STATE OF~TJTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

:

SS .

T, Linda Munford, hereby depose and state under oath as
follows:
1.

I am

plaintiff

in

the

above entitled

litigation

matter for the pursuit of return of vehicle owned by plaintiff,
namely, a 1992 Lexus SC400 vehicle.
2.

Subsequent to the filing of complaint and answer in

the above matter circumstances completely changed causing that
this

plaintiff

gave

ovei

subject vehicle pursuant
Stipulation

also

title

and

interest

in and

to the

to Stipulation on file herein.

designated

the

transfer

of

other

Said

personal

property and rights to be given to the defendant as set forth

hereafter.
3.

The

Stipulation

agreed

that

plaintiff's

judgment

against defendant in small claims court, Civil No. 994004279SC,
allowing recovery of rents and other damages to plaintiff in
the amount of $5,071.00 with interest be completely dismissed
with prejudice in favor of defendant. (See plaintiff's Exhibit
U !I

A

attached hereto).
4.

parties,

A previously disputed matter of debts betweem the
potentially

a

litigation

matter

regarding the amount of $1,400.00, was

for

small

claims

stipulated in favor of

defendant and plaintiff agreed to pay the amount to defendant
by March
allows

31, 2000.

for

plaintiff.
5.
further

If payment

judgment

in

amount

to

be

the

Stipulation

entered

against

plaintiff

without

(See Stipulation on file herein).
The

Stipulation

consideration

following

that

is not made

personal

shall

property

allows
turn
owned

that
over

the

defendant

the

or

in

possession

of

plainti ff:
Sanyo 25" TV; Sanyo stereo; Emerson boom box; mattress
and bed frame; Pantex camera; thirty CD's; fifty music tapes;
microphone; white night stand and lamp; iron; microwave; alarm
clock; brown plates, dishes and cups; Polish passport; tire"
rims for Lexus; headlights for Lexus; two pillows; white
blanket; pictures of defendant's mother; father and other
relatives; day planner; bowling ball with shoes and carrier;
Masters Degree Certificate for Zdzistaw Bienkowski; brown
shoes; black shoes; sandals; snow shoes; cowboy boots; light
green suit; two pair of pants with jacket; black pants; green
jeans; light brown jeans; blue jeans; three ties; dark green
coat; two red and blue jackets; leather jacket with hat; belts;
black shirt; three white shirts; polish t-shirl with eagle;
four Adidas t-shirts; two Nike t-shirts; Chaps t-shirt; Olympic
t-shirt ; four three button t-shirts; and Awa stereo.
Much

of the personal property enumerated was owned or

receivcMl by plaintiff

as a gift

property of defendant.
6.

Attorney

allowd I

and was never

the personal

(See Stipulation on file herein).
fees

to

enforce

the

Stipulation

were

defendant.

7.

The

circumstances

that

caused

plaintiff

no

alternative to commit to such a Stipulation were that plaintiff
was

sentenced

involvement
entitled

to

in

a

a

Court.

short

jail

term

criminal

matter

Plaintiff

was

of

several

pending
allowed

months

before
to

be

the
Ifee

for

above
from

imposition of the subject criminal sentence of the court except
that

there

existed

that required

a Protective

Order

obtained

by

defendant

dismissal before plaintiff could be freed from

the jail sentence and on probation only.
8.

At

the

same

time

the

jail

sentence

was

imposed

plaintiff's daughter was seriously ill and with no one to care
for her except the plaintiff herein.
9.
plaintiff

Therefore
to

secure

two

significant

the dismissal

reasons

existed

of defendant's

for

Protective

Order against plaintiff.
10.
entered

After the Stipulation and Order of this"Court was

defendant

dismissed

the Protective Order pursuant to

the agreement. (See plaintiff's Exhibit
11.

Release

dismissal

B attached hereto).

of the plaintiff from jail was effective

(See Exhibit "C M attached hereto)

thereafter.
12.

f! u

The
of

incarcerated.

plaintiff
his

first

Protective

approached defendant about a
Older

after

she

had

been

Plaintiff explained to defendant that she could

Stipulation and 'Order herein may be set aside and plaintiff be
restored to her rights.
DATED this

day of April, 2000.

Linda Munford
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
April, 2000.
NOTARY PUBLIC

day of

FIIID oisTnicreinuaT
Third Judicial District

FEB 0 7 2000

Linda Munford, Pro So
5242 Cobblccreek Road, #13- il
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Phone: 42 4-3 5 26/560-65 00

*r\

IN THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY JUSTICE COURT
COUNTY OF S'Al,r LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA MUNFOUD,
MOTION AND ORDER-TO
DISMISS SMALL CLAIMS

Pla.inti.tf ,
v,

Caso No. 9 ^ 4 0 i H ? 7 9 S C
J uiTq e i Pe?ggy-ATTOTnb-

M/WUUSZ RTENKOWSKI,

^ C ^ / 2 ^ 7 S -i*HRMS

Defendant.

COMES NOV;, plaint iff and rcoves the above-entitled court
to dismiss this action and the motion for supplement proceed!nys
with prejudice,

DATED thjsu^

day of January, 2000.
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STATE Of UTAH

SUBSCHLBED AND SWORN to before me th.ii*** _ day of -JarmafV-', 7000.
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ruruc
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My Commissi.on Expire'

Exhibit "A"
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JAM J [ _./] f ^

STATE OF UTAH
MARIUSZ

/

By

BIENKOWSKI,

MOTIOW AND ORDER TO
DISMISS PROTECTIVE ORDER

Plaintiff,

\)

Case No. 994905991CA
Judge: Homer F. Wilkinson

LINDA MUNFORD,
Defendant,

COMES NOW, plaintiff and moves the above-entitled court
to dismiss the protective order that has been entered in this
matter.

DATED this ^£_

day of January, 2000,
'OTA&Y PUBUC

v::r,;»A I P M4157

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKX
Plaintiff

>*rn'>s.S'Cn Expire*
3TATE OF UTAH

-d«iy_.of January/

S U B S C R I B E D A N D SWORN to b e f o r e me t h i s

V
/ ^

^

NOTARY PUBLIC
R e s i d i n g i n : Mj^ray, . Utah
My Commission Expires:

08/23/2001

Exhibit

"B"

2000,

ORDER
BASED upon the motion filed by plaintiff, a copy of
which is on file herein, and other good and sufficient cause
having been shown, it is hereby ordered and decreed *~hat this
action be dismissed.

DATED thi<* 21

day of

, ^ ^ ^

, 2000.
BY THE COURT:X
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RONALfl

MARTIN J. PEZELY, #2598
Attorney for Defendant
7 700 South Maple Street
Midvale, Utah 8404?
Phone: 255-1261
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LINDA MUNFORD,
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Plaintiff,

:

v,

;

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSK1,

:

Defendant.

Civil No. 990906380
Judge: Glenn K. Iwasaki

:

COMES NOW, the plaintiff and defendant and enters into
the following settlement aqreempnt with the intent of resolving
all the issues contained in the abovp-enti>led

matter

The parties acknowledqe that they are entering into this
agreement voluntarily and that they intend to be bound by the
terms and conditions of this settlement agreement.
WHEREAS, plaintiff has filed an action against defendant
in the above-entitled court involving a 1992 Lexus SC400 vehicle,
\
vehicle identxficatibn number/serial number JT8UZ30C4N0009924; and
WHERFAS, plaintiff has filed another action in small
claims couit in Salt Lake County, State of Utah under civil no.
994004279SC; &nd
WHFREAS,

the parties have m c u n e d certain credit c&td

obligations; and
WHEREAS, plaintiff has in her possession or in her
control

miscellaneous pergonal items that belong to the defendant;

and
WHEREAS, each

party

has

issued

a protective

order

against the other party; and
WHEREAS,

the parties wish to resolve all the above

issues and have agreed to a settlement that each is willing to
enter into with the intent of settling said issues.
WHEREAS/ the parties hereto each warrant and represent
to

the other

that

they

fully

understand

all of

the terms,

covenants, conditions and obligations incumbent upon each of them
by virtue of this agreement to be performed or contemplated by
each of them hereunder, and each believes the same to be fair,
just and reasonable,
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of
the covenants contained herein, the parties hereto mutually agree
as follows:
1.

That both parties hav^ received a copy of the

settlement agreement, have reviewed the contents and understand
said contents.
2,

That plaintiif shall dismiss with prejudice the

above-entitled action and by said dismissal agreeo that defendant
2

shall have all the right, title and interest involving a 1992
Lexus SC400 vehicle, vehicle identification number/serial number
JT8U2

4N0009924, without any claim by plaintiff.
3,

That

plaintiff

shall

immediately

dismiss

with

prejudice the small claims court action she has filed under civil
no. 994004279SC.
4,

That plaintiff shall pay defendant the sum of

$1,400.00 to be used by defendant towards payment of the credit
card obligations incurred by the parties.
not later than March 31, 2000.

Said sum shall be paid

If plaintiff shall fail to pay

said sum by March 31, 2000 then a judgement shall enter against
plaintiff for $1,400.00 in favor of the defendant.
5,

That plaintiff shall return to defendant not later

than February 15, 2000 the following peisonal items:
Sanyo 25" tv; Sanyo stereo; Emerson boom box; mattress
and bed frame; Pantex camera; thirty CD's; fifty music
tapes; microphone; white niqht stand and lamp; iron;
microwave; alarm clock; brown plates, dishes and cups;
Polish passport; tire rims for Lexus; headlights for
Lexus; two pillows; white blanket; pictures of my
client's mother, father and other relatives; day
planner; bawling ball with shoes and carrier; Masters
Degree Certificate for Zdzistaw Bienkowski; brown shoes;
black shoes; sandals; snow shoes; cowboy boots; light
green suit; two pair of pants with jacket; black pants;
green jeans; light brown jeans; blue jeans; three ties;
dark green coat; two red and blue jackets; leather
jacket with hat; belts; black shirt; three white shirts;
polish t-shirt with eagle; four Adidas t-shirts; two
Nike t-shirts; Chaps t-shirt; Olympic t-shirt; four
three button t-shirts; and Awa stereo.

6.

That each party shall take the necessary steps to

try to diamies the protective order each has against the other.
7*

That plaintiff shall not have any contact whether

personal via telephone or any other means with defendant, his
family located here in the United States or any member of his
family in Poland.
8.

That defendant shall not have any contact whether

personal via telephone or any other means with plaintiff or her
family.
9.

That each party shall assume and pay their own

attorney fees and court costs incurred in this action.
10.

That if any party to this agreement shall incur any

costs resulting from enforcement of this agreement or any of the
provisions of this agreement, the defaulting party shall be liable
to the prevailing party for such costs.

Costs, as used, herein,

shall include costs of enforcement, interpretation, or collection,
including, without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees, court
costs, collection charges, travel and other related or similar
expenses.
11.

This\ agreement shall be binding upon and shall

m u r e to the benefit of the parties hereto, and their respective
legal representatives, successors and assigns,
12.

That the foregoing constitutes the entire agreement
4

of the parties.

DATED this

day of January, 2000-

L # D A HUNFORD

V

oi
~~

Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this $ g
HOTtmrwuc

day of^ January, 2000,

_

NANCY t-VAN VOOflHW
?\tik S. Unic* p * * A*».
Mktv^tLfTd4047

ft-4

smjs«^

NOTARY PWvIC
Resiaing<

AWL 7. 3002
rrAT* of UTAM

My Commission Expires:
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

DATED this a2S

r

day of Januaiy, 2000,
NOTAm PUgtfC

MARIUSZ BJENKOWSKJ
Defendant
SUBSCRIBED AND SvioRN to before me this ^2? day of January, 2000

My Commission Expires: 08/23/2001
5

Attorney for Defendant
7700 South Maple Street
Midvais, Utah 64641
Phonei 255-1261
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LINDA MUNFORD,
Plaintiff

ORDEF

v.
Civil No. 990906380

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKT,

Judge: Glenn K, Iwasaki

Defendant

Based upon th<* nripulation of thp parties, a copy of which
is on file herein, and other good and sufficient cause having
been shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED:
1*

That the stipulation of the parties is approved and the

above entitled matter is dismissed with prejudice. TXt fej****
Jt'pvLiJ^t*

^

*^c

^ C M / M A / I C /

DATED this 3ls~h

vday of

*LX

/*«rtt

+/*%(** 0,*Z*A •

A~<^7vum^
BY THE COURT;

2000,

of

fb-

ORDER
BASED upon the motion filed by plaintiff, a copy of
which is on file herein, and other good and sufficient cause
having been shown, it is hereby ordered and decreed that this
action be dismissed.

\

DATED this ^1

day of vJi>l/uu-M^

, 2000.

Q
BY THE COURT:

Thira Judicial District jfr

JAN , _;j
M a r i u s z B i e n k o w s k i , P r o Se
P.O. B o x 712425
BySalt Lake City, Utah 84171-2425

/

SALT LAKE CjQU.NTY

IN T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T O F S A L T r X A K E 'COUNTY'"•-*

JAM ,

STATE OF UTAH

-J

-

V- Z „ K

By.

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI,

MOTION AND ORDER TO
DISMISS PROTECTIVE ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 994905991CA
Judge: Homer F. Wilkinson

LINDA MUNFORD,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, plaintiff and moves the above-entitled court
to dismiss the protective order that has been entered in this
matter.

DATED this £$

day of January, 2000,
'OTARY PUBLIC
•<r<M J PEZELY

- */i*\ owv*ew Rd
w ... ^ m 44157
n<rii>^on Expires
VJQJSI 23fX3 2001
--TATE OF UTAH

/J&

ec^J^t^^

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI
Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

f January, 2000

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in: Murray, Utah
My Commission Expires: 08/23/2001

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 3 1 201
Linda Munford, Pro Se
5242 Cobblecreek Road, #11-H
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Phone: 424-3526/560-6580

8ALTLAKE

*

A

^
Deputy Clerfc

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LINDA MUNFORD,
MOTION AND ORDER TO
DISMISS PROTECTIVE ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 994906198CA
Judge: William Bohling

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, plaintiff and moves the above-entitled court
to dismiss the protective order that has been entered in this
matter.

^

DATED this(9?y

day of January, 2000,

vda

yyiuiJ-c^tx

:NDA MUNFORD
Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this<5o_ day of January, 2000
NOTARY PUftijc

J V ^ L 7, 2002

STATE OF U T A M

My Commission Expires:

•

Bradley! Schofieid, #1520
Anderson & Holland
623 East First South
P.O.Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643
Telephone: (801) 363-9345

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT ', - "ATE (V UT/yH

LINDA MUNFORD,
Plaintiff,
vs

;
>
>
}

REPLY TO MOTION TO SET
ASIDE STIPULATION AND ORDER

]
>

Civil No. 990906380

I

Judge Glen K. Iwasaki

MARTUSZ BIENKOWSKI,
Defendant

COMTS NOW Defendant by and through his attorney, Bradley J Schofieid, and
hereby submits the following Reply to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Stipulation md
Order as follows
FACTS
I

That Plaintiff was represented by Randy S Ludlow, Esq., in the above-

entitled action
2.

That Plaintiff fired said counsel before trial date.

3

That Plaintiff contacted Defendant's counsel, Martin Pezely (Pezely),

stating that she wanted a Settlement Agreement between the parties.

4.

That Plaintiff stated to Pezely that she needed Defendant to dismiss his

protective order against her in order for her to be released from Oxbow jail, where she
was being held on an unrelated matter
5.

That Plaintiff told Pezely what provisions she would agree to in said

Settlement Agreement
6.

That after advising his client, Pezely drafted said Settlement Agreement

according to Plaintiffs instructions
7

That Plaintiff and Defendant entered mto a Settlement Agreement on or

about January 28, 2000. A copy of said Settlement Agreement is attached and marked
Exhibit "A".
8.

That both parties signed said Settlement Agreement m front of a Notary

9

That paragraph 6 of said Settlement Agreement states that both Plaintiff

Public

and Defendant would try to get the protective order against the other dismissed
10

That the criminal matter in which Defendant was serving time in jail was

unrelated to any and all matters pertaining to Plaintiff and Defendant A copy of
Plaintiffs record for Case No 991107201 is attached and marked Exhibit *T3"
ARGUMENT
THERE WAS .NO DURESS IN THE EXECUTION OF SAID SETTLEMfaNl
AGREEMENT
I. The Parties Agreed To Mutually Dismiss Protective Orders tiled Against Both Parties
Plaintiff states that she "had to give up everything", m older to get Defendant to
agTee to dismiss a protective order against her However, Plaintiff was the party who
requested the dismissal of the protective orders I urthei, both paities had protective

orders against the other and it was agreed that they would mutually dismiss said
protective orders in paragraph 6 of said Settlement Agreement. See Exhibit 4tA"
Mutually agreeing to dismiss protective orders whjch were in place against both
parties certainly does not appear to be putting one of the parties under duress. In fact,
Defendant did not want the protective order against Plaintiff dismissed, but m the interest
of settling several matters between the parties he agreed to said provision.
As shown by the records of Plaintiffs said criminal matter, there is no mention of
getting said protective oider dismissed in ordei for Plaintiff to be released from jail See
Fxhibit "B"
Plaintiff alleges that she could not be released from jail without said protective
order being dismissed, yet proffers no evidence that dismissal of said protective order by
Defendant was a prerequisite to her release from jail Even if Defendant knew that
Plaintiff could be released upon his dismissal of sand protective order, Plaintiff received
consideration equal to that of Defendant in that both parties were required to dismiss their
respective protective orders against the other
Plamtift has not satisfied her burden of pioof showing that the dismissal of said
protective older enabled her to be released from incarceration Additionally, even had the
dismissal of said protective order been a pre requisite to Plaintiff being released from jail,
Plaintiff received the exact consideration as did Defendant
II. Plaintiff Approached Defendant For a Settlement Agreement
Plaintiff was the party \*ho appioached Defendant in order to diaft a Settlement
Agreement See Affidavit of Martin J Pezely Additionally, Plaintiff contacted Pe/cly
and indicated the provisions she wanted in said Settlement Agreement Pczelv prepared

and presented a draft of said Settlement Agreement to Plaintiff for her approval while she
was serving time at Oxbow jail on an unrelated matter. Plaintiff reviewed said Settlement
Agreement for several hours and executed the document without any complaints or
concerns to Pezely concerning said Settlement Agieement
Certainly, a person who approaches another in the interest of settling litigation is
not put under duress Io sign the very agreement they requested
III. riairt tiff has not shown Any Duress In Execution Of Settlement Agt cement
Plaintiff has not offeied any proof that said Settlement was executed undei duiess
In order to invalidate an agreement the party bringing the action must show the following
three factors, I) that the other contracting party committed a wrongful act, 7) which put
the initial party m fear, 3) such as to compel him to act against his will Fox v Piercev,
227 P 2d 763 (Utah 1951)
Defendant did not Commit any wrongful acts Plaintiff and Defendant entered into
a Settlement Agreement of their own free will Plaintiff was advised fo seek legal counsel
when discussing the possibility of a Settlement Agreement in order to resolve matters
concerning the parties See the Affidavit of Martin I Peezely Both parties gave and
received consideration for said Settlement Agreement Finally, Plaintiff lias offered no
pioof that there was any wrongdoing on the part of Defendant
Plaintiff was not put in fear by Defendant Simply because Plaintiff could he
released from jail only if she had said protective order dismissed does not show that
Plaintiff was m feai Again Plaintiff has shown no proof tint Defendant forced her to
stipulate to all of the facts contained in the Settlement Agreement in oidei to agree to
dismiss said protective order

Lastly, Plaintiff was not compelled to act against her will. From the face of the
Settlement Agreement there is no sign that Plaintiff signed said document against her
will. Plaintiff has not offered any proof that said Settlement Agreement wa$ against her
will, thus Plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of proof
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Settlement Agreement and both parties
signed the document m fiont of a notary The Settlement Agreement was to resolve issues
between the parties so that they could both move ort with their lives Plaintiff has failed to
prove any of the allegations set forth in her Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside
Stipulation and Order
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Motion should be dismissed
DA r ED tins _p

day of MjryJ"»
> ^
B
Attorney for Defendant
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Rex B. Bushman, Esq. #0521
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
115 E. Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-8020
Facsimile: (801) 533-8877
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LINDA MUNFORD,

:

Plaintiff,

: REPLY MEMORANDUN

vs.

:

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI,

: Civil No. 990906380

Defendant.

: Judge Glen K. Iwasaki

COMES NOW the above named plaintiff, Linda Munford, by
and

through

counsel

of

record,

Rex

B.

Bushman,

and

hereby

replies to defendant's Reply (Response) To Motion To Set Aside
Stipulation And Order, stating as follows:
REPLY FACTS
1.
counsel

In
and

reply
to

to

the

complete

statement
the

of defendant's

scenario

of

events

former
of

the

settlement as plaintiff recalls, she hereby adds the following
to

the

facts

plaintiff's

stated

in her

Memorandun

In

initial
Support

affidavit
of

Motion

included
To

Set

with
Aside

Stipulation And Order.
2.
on January

Plaintiff was incarcerated on January 5th, 2000, and
7th, she applied

for release on the ankle monitor
-1-

system which would allow release from the Oxbow jail and that
she could go back to work.
3.

Sgt.

restraining
monitor
under

order

system

she

M ff

A

hereto).

informed

could

pursuant

Procedure:

Exhibit

to

be

that

with

released

a

on

pending

the

the offender eligibility

Section

attached

not

her

Criteria,

Section

ankle

criteria

A.2.c.

(See

to plaintiff's reply affidavit attached

She was informed she met all other criteria.

4.
contact

Cogburn

Plaintiff called her friend Teresa, and asked her to

the defendant

and ask him for a mutual dismissal of

protective orders.
5.
protective

The defendant responded that he would not drop the
order unless plaintiff

car, dismiss

gave him ownership

of her

a $5,000.00 judgment against him and give him

most of the belongings in her home.

The estimated requirement

was that plaintiff pay about $20,000.00 for defendant to drop
his protective order.
6.

Defendant then told his attorney plaintiff wanted to

give him everything

for dropping the protective order and had

Mr. Pezely

the

draw up

stipulation.

Defendant

informed Mr.

Pezely what to put in the agreement.
7.

Mr.

incarcerated

Pezely

didn ! t

when he drew up

plaintiff

called

agreement

to

be

after

know

the papers

waiting

prepared.

even

Until

for

but

three

then, Mr.

plaintiff
found

out when

weeks
Pezely

plaintiff had just agreed to give defendant everything.
-2-

was

for

the

thought

8.

Mr. Pezely was surprised plaintiff was doing this to

get released
drop

from jail.

the protective

plaintiff

decided

He wasn't

sure plaintiff needed to

to get

He just

order

to

give

released.

defendant

everything

thought

for her

own

reasons,
9.

Not

only was plaintiff awaiting hoped for release

from the suffering of incarceration but her daughter was having
serious health problems as indicated by her doctor's letter,
(see

!l ff

Exhibit

B

attached hereto),

attached

to

plaintiff's

reply

and plaintiff was needed

affidavit,

to give her care

where no one else was available.

order

10.

Further

was

required

evidence
before

plaintiffTs

son's

affidavit,

attached

affidavit

the

release

plaintiff
attached

hereto

as

conversation with Sgt. Cogburn.

of

could
to

the

protective

leave

jail

plaintiff's

Exhibit

"C"

is

reply

about

his

A friend's statement is also

attached hereto as Exhibit "D" regarding her conversation with
Sgt. Cogburn.
11.
five

Plaintiff had the stipulation documents for about

minutes.

A

notary

notary took the papers.

stood by, plaintiff

signed

and

the

Mr. Pezely may not have come to pick

them up until later but they were not in plaintiff's possession
for several hours.
12.

When plaintiff finally spoke to Mr. Pezely she told

him she wasn't happy about giving up everything required but
she needed to care for her daughter.
-3-

See Reply Affidavit

of Linda Munford, attached hereto

for facts and Exhibits designated herebefore.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PROTECTIVE ORDER HAD TO BE DISMISSED BEFORE

PLAINTIFF COULD LEAVE JAIL.
Defendant
Memorandum

has

argued

supporting

in

Motion

To

response
Set

to

Aside

plaintiff's

Stipulation

And

Order, that no proof has been shown that plaintiff could not be
released

from

jail

without

withdrawal

or

dismissal

of

the

defendant's protective order.
Plaintiff submits in this Reply Memorandum including her
Reply Affidavit, evidence that proves she could not be released
without

the

Included
sworn

in

dismissal
the

of

evidence

the

defendant's

submitted

statement, the actual rule

which shows the requirements

protective

herewith

received

is

order.

plaintiff's

from Sgt. Cogburn

for release from the Oxbow jail

including Section A.2.c. stating specifically the requirement
"no protective orders".
statements

of plaintiff's

Also included herewith are the sworn
son and

friend who both talked to

Sgt. Cogburn and confirmed that plaintiff could not be released
from jail while the protective order was in effect.
Thus
dismissal

of

the

argument

that

the protective

the

order

plaintiff

did

not

need

to obtain he release must

fail and the plaintiff's argument that she was under duress and
fear that she would not otherwise be released is applicable and
subject to the doctrine of Fox vs. Piercey, 227 P. 2d 763 (Utah
1951).

The defendant (1) committed a wrongful act by requiring
-4-

approximately

$20,000.00

for

the

trade

of

dismissing

his

protective order; (2) plaintiff was in fear of not being able
to obtain her release otherwise; and (3) she was required to
act against her will.
As

a

person

in

jail

plaintiff

was

in

distress.

Plaintiff has not elaborated on the suffering of an individual
in

jail

because

the

suffering

of

being

assumable as punishment at an exquisite level.

incarcerated

is

Courts will not

enforce a bargain where one party has unconscionably taken
advantage

of

the

distress

of

the

other.

Inman vs. Clyde

Hall Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1962).
II.

PLAINTIFF HAD TO OBTAIN RELEASE FROM JAIL TO TAKE

CARE OF HER DAUGHTER WHO WAS SERIOUSLY ILL.
Defendant has acquiesced to plaintifffsargument that she
needed to obtain release from jail to take care of her daughter
who was seriously ill and plaintiff the only available person
to care for the daughter.

Plaintiff further submits herein her

daughter's doctor's letter evidencing the daughter's serious
health

condition

incarcerated.

diagnosed

on

the day after plaintiff was

Defendant has failed to respond to plaintiff!s

argument on that issue and therefor allows that plaintiff was
under duress and fear that required her to act against her will
to obtain release for the sake of her daughter's health.
Given plaintiff's status as incarcerated and that her
daughter needed her care for a serious illness, plaintiff had
no reasonable alternative but to agree to defendant's demands.
The doctrine of duress shall remedy such an occurrence where
-5-

7&
plaintiff was compelled
alternative.

to act as she did with no reasonable

Frank Culver E l e c , Inc. vs. Jorgenson, 664 P. 2d

226 (Ariz. 1983) .
III.

PLAINTIFF ONLY REQUESTED DISMISSAL OF PROTECTIVE

ORDERS, DEFENDANT WRONGFULLY REQUIRED MORE.
Plaintiff
dismissal
required
plaintiff

of

only

requested

of

defendant

orders.

It

was

protective

further

settlement

the

of approximately

the

mutual

defendant
$20,000.00

who
from

to defendant for the mutual dismisal of protective

orders.
Plaintiff
defendant's

denies

attorney.

offering

the

terms

Further, plaintiff

defendant's

to

settlement

denies having

seek

the

to

been

requested

by

counsel.

Instead plaintiff was advised to fire her attorney,

which she did.

attorney

of

advice

of

Otherwise Pezely couldn't prepare the stipulation.

The requirement of a wrongful act may be met if it is
wrongful

in

the moral

sense.

Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc.

vs. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 584 P.2d 15, (Alaska 1978) 9
A.L.R. 4th 928.

The requirement of a trade of $20,000.00 to

obtain the mutual release of protective orders is immoral even
if

plaintiff

wasn't

incarcerated

or

needing

to

care

for

a

daughter in ill health.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff
Fox vs. Piercey

has

met

all

conditions

under

Utah

law

of

to be relieved of the subject stipulation and

order herein by way of the doctrine of duress.
-6-

DATED this

j %

day of May, 2000.
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C.

Rex B. Bushman

-7-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of

the

foregoing

REPLY MEMORANDUM

with

accompanying

REPLY

AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA MUNFORD to the following counsel, postage
prepaid and by U.S. Mail, this

j'/j^ day of May, 2000:

Bradley J. Schofield
Anderson & Holland
623 East First South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0643

-8-

Rex B. Bushman, Esq. #0521
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
115 E. Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 533-8020
Facsimile:
(801) 533-8877

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA MUNFORD,

:

Plaintiff,

: REPLY AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA
MUNFORD

VS.

:

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI,

: Civil No. 990906380

Defendant.

: Judge Glen K. Iwasaki

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

I, Linda Munford, hereby depose and state under oath as
follows:
1.
counsel

In response
and

to

to

complete

the statement of defendant's
the

settlement as I recall I would

scenario

of

events

former
of

the

like to add the following to my

former affidavit.
2.
January

7th

I

was

incarcerated

I applied

on

January

5th,

2000

for release on the ankle monitor

and

on

system

which would allow release from the Oxbow jail and allow me to
go to work.

3.

Sgt.

Cogburn

informed

me

that

with

a

pending

restraining order I could not be released on the ankle monitor
system

pursuant

to

Procedure: Section

the

Criteria

included herewith.)
4.

offender

eligibility

criteria

under

(See Exhibit "Afl

Section A.2.c.

I was informed I met all other criteria.

1 called my friend Teresa, and asked her to contact

the defendant and ask him to drop his protective order.
5.

The defendant responded that he would not drop the

protective

order

unless

I

gave

him

ownership

of

my

car,

dismissed a $5,000.00 judgment against him and gave him most of
the belongings in my house.

The estimate requirement was about

$20,000.00 for dropping the protective order.
6.

Defendant then told his attorney I wanted to give

him everything for dropping the restraining order and had Mr.
Pezely draw

up the stipulation.

Defendant informed Mr. Pezely

what to put in the agreement.
Mr. Pezely didnft even know I was incarcerated when

7.

he drew up the papers but found out when I called after waiting
for three weeks for the agreement to be prepared.
Mr.

Pezely

thought

I

had

just

agreed

to

Until then,

give

defendant

everything.
8.
released
protective

Mr. Pezely was
from

jail.

order

to

surprised I was doing this to get

He wasn't
get

sure

released.

I needed
He

just

to

drop

thought

the

I had

decided to give defendant everything.
9.

Not only was I awaiting hoped for release from the

suffering of incarceration but my daughter was having serious

health

problems

as

indicated

by her

doctor's

letter,

(See

Exhibit "B" attached hereto), and I was needed to give her care
where no one else was avialable.
10.
order

For

was

further

evidence

required before

the release of protective

I could

affidavit attached hereto as Exhibit
with

Sgt.

Cogburn.

hereto as Exhibit

A

friend's

leave jail is my
ff M

C

about his conversation

statement

"D" regarding her

son's

is also attached

conversation with Sgt.

Cogburn.
11.

I was requested to fire my attorney, which I did.

12.

I had

minutes.

the stipulation

documents

for about five

A notary stood by, I signed and she took the papers.

Mr. Pezely may not have come to pick them up until later but
they were not in my possession for several hours.
13.

When I finally spoke to Mr. Pezely 1 told him I

wasn't happy about giving up everything required but I needed
to care for my daughter.
DATED this

i\2 ^day of May, 2000.

Linda Munford
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

1 CV

day of

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Purpose of Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the Department's policy, procedure
and requirements governing the use of Operations of the Electronic Monitonng
program.
Definitions:
Alarm:

Electronic signal emitted when the transmitter leaves the reception area of the receiver during a
penod of designated confinement

Electronic Monitonng:
1
2
3
Host Computer:

Places an electronic transmitter on the body of the offender,
Sending a signal to a receiver installed in the offender's home, and
Logs the offenders movement in and out of the range of the receiver
The mam computer system through which the functions of the Electronic Monitonng
Program are processed.

OFFENDER ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
Policy
The Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office Electronic Momtonng program is to monitor the location and
movements of offenders living outside of confinement, who have been deemed by the Electronic
Momtonng Officer eligible to participate in the program
Rational
Electronic Monitonng provides increased supervisory control of offenders living outside of confinement
and provides additional protection to the community not otherwise available through traditional
supervision methods
Procedure: Section Criteria
A

In order for an offender to be eligible for electronic monitonng, the offender shall
1

Live in Salt Lake County, and/or adjoining counties

2

Be designated as low risk and does not fall into anv of the following criteria
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
l
j

aggravated or violent felony offense,
domestic violence one year, if committed m the Present of Children never
BQ protective ordera, ex parte orders
no escapes past 1 years 5 years if they run while on this program,
no convictions burglary of a dwelling,
no enmes against children,
no felony sex crimes,
no transients,
no juveniles,
no holds lor other agencies, CM will be considered and WA will not be considered

Exhibit

"A"

2

k.
1.

B.

no active gang members; NCIC hits or listed with Metro Gangs as active.
no Federal holds of ACQLtype.

3.

Must have a private phone line in his/her home or have one installed and shall bear the cost of
installation and the monthly fees and any other special fees required.

4.

Must have permanent residence during the length of the Electronic Monitoring program.

Any exceptions to the above critena shall be approved by the momtonng officer prior to an offender being
accepted into the program.

REFERENCE PROCEDURE
Policy
Is it the policy of the Department that:
A.

Offenders shall meet the cntena outlined in this chapter for acceptance into the program and all references
shall be evaluated by the Electronic Monitormg Officer, and

B.

The Electronic Momtonng Supervisor may approve the acceptance of any offender mto the program who
does not meet the established cnteria.

Rationale
Because resources are limited for this program due to high cost of equipment, stringent selection critena
must be used.
Procedure: Reference Procedure
References will be taken from the Sheriffs Electronic Monitoring Application that is filled out by the
offender, or a refenal given to us by the applicant's references
A.

Offenders will give a minimum of three references, of which two must be positive for the offender,
and
a reference from a member of the residence where the offender will be staying who mustbe at least
18 years old

B

If the reference is not the owner of the residence, the residence owner must be contacted, ana agree
to remove all cunent phone features from the phone line that will be connected to the monitor

INSTALLATION
Policy
It is the policy of the Department that the olfender shall bear the cost of any phone installation or monthly
tees as well as the replacement cost for any Department equipment which may be lost, stolen or damaged
while the offender is in the program.
Rationale

Salt,
Lang
Women's
Center, T.C
May 10, 2000

Re

Rachael Munford

To Whom it May Concern,
Rachacl is patient who was diagnosed with a positive H Pylori on January 3, 2000

Michael I Twede, M D

1

-7—P-^ —

OBSTETRICS

GYNECOLOGY

INFFRTI! ITY
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AFFADAVIT
May 11, 2000
On January 5*, 2000, my mother was incarcerated at the Oxbow Facility. On January 7 l ,
she applied for the electronic monitoring program and was denied because of a protective
order that was in force between her and Mariusz Bienkowski.
I met with Sgt. Cogburn at Oxbow and he informed me that my mother, Linda Munford,
could not be released until the protective order from Mariusz was dropped.

DATED this

/ /

day of May, 2000.
?

-7

s

Vance Malan
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

//^A

day of May. 2000.

Notary Public
1
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AFFADAVIT
May 11,2000
On January 5rh, 2000, my mother, Linda Munford was incarcerated at the Oxbow
Facility.On January 7th, she applied for the electronic monitoring program and was
denied because of a protective order that was in force between her and Mariusz
Bienkowski.
I called and spoke with Sgt. Cogburn at Oxbow and he told me that my mother could be
released if the protective order was dropped.
.
DATED this

day of Ma

Rachael Mu
SUBSCRIBED

AND SWORN to before me this

NOTARY PUBLIC
RYAN STANTON
1344 West 4675 South
Ogden, Utah 84405
My Commission Expires
April 14 2004

STVTE OF UTAH
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Rex B. Bushman, Esq. #0521
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
115 E. Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-8020
Facsimile: (801) 533-8877
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Linda Munford,
Plaintiff,

: NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION

vs.

:

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI,

: Civil No. 990906380

Defendant.

: Judge Glen K. Iwasaki

COMES NOW the above named plaintiff, Linda Munford, by
and through counsel of record, Rex B. Bushman, and hereby
submits

for

decision,

STIPULATION

AND

ORDER

Plaintiff's

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff's

MOTION

filed

the

IN

with

SUPPORT

TO

above

OF MOTION

SET

ASIDE

Court

with

TO

SET ASIPE

STIPULATION AND ORDER on or about April 19, 2000.

Defendant

responded with a REPLY TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE STIPULATION AND
ORDER submitted on or about May 2, 2000.
plaintiff filed a REPLY MEMORANDUM.

On May 12, 2000,

The matter is now ready

for the adjudication of the above Court.
This Notice to Submit For Decision is brought pursuant
to

Rule

4-501

Code

of

Judicial

Administration,

Utah

Code

Annotated.
DATED this

/^

day of May, 2000.
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C

By
Rex B. Bushman

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION to the following
counsel, postage prepaid and by U.S. Mail, this

j J,

May, 2000:
Bradley J. Schofield
Anderson & Holland
623 East First South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643

1-^iY A' ^i'M^>

day of

J. Kent Holland, Z1520
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
Attorneyfor Plaintiff
623 East First South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643
Telephone: (801) 363-9345
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LINDA MUNFORD

;
ORDER TO DENY MOTION TO
SET ASIDE STIPULATION AND
ORDER

vs.

)
)
])
)

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI,

;)

Civil No • 990906380

)

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came before the court on June 20, 2000, the Plaintiff
was represented by, her counsel Rex B Bushman and Defendant Mariusz Bienkowski
was represented by, his counsel J Kent Holland After heanng oral argument and good
cause showing regarding the matter it is hereby ordered
THAT THE MOTION IS HEREBY DENIED
DATED this ^

day of

j " ty ^ £

2000

BY THE COURT

HONERABLE GLENN K IWASAKI
Approved as to frojru,

P/ 7* £

Rex B Bushman
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy
of Defendant's Order to deny Motion to set aside stipulation and
Order, in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this
of June, 2000. Addressed to:

Rex B. Bushman Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
115 E. Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

4#«; ^ y j

day

Rex B. Bushman, Esq. #0521
REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant
115 E. Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-8020
Facsimile: (801) 533-8877
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LINDA MUNFORD,
Plaintiff, Appellant,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
Civil No. 990906380

MARIUSZ BIENKOWSKI,
Defendant, Appellee.
COMES NOW

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

the above named plaintiff, appellant, Linda

Munford, by and through counsel of record, and hereby appeals
the Order To Deny Motion To Set Aside Stipulation And Order
previously authorized by the above Court on June 29, 2000, a
copy of which is attached hereto.

The appellee is the above

named defendant Mariusz Bienkowski.

This appeal is taken from

the Third Judicial District Court to the Utah Appellate Court.
This

appeal

is

brought

pursuant

to

Rule

3

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate Procedure from a final Order of the Third Judicial
District Court.
DATED this

>L7

day of July, 2000,

REX B. BUSHMAN, P.C.

By:

?£/-yC
Rex B. Bushman

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following counsel,
'<Lk> day of July,

postage prepaid and by U.S. Mail, this
2000:
J . Kent Holland
Anderson & Holland
623 E a s t F i r s t South
P.O. Box 11643
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84147-0643

Cdft'l

A

HjiVi^l

ADDENDUM
A:

Exhibit "A" - Elibibity Criteria (attached to Reply Memorandum

B:

Exhibit "B" - Letter from Doctor (attached to Reply Memorandum

C:

Exhibit "C" - Son's discussion with Sgt. Cogburn (attached to Reply
Memorandum)

D:

Exhibit "D" - Daughter's conversation with Sgt. Cogburn (attached
To Reply Memordandum)

A:

"Stipulation" allowing for Judgment in amount of $1,400.00
(attached to Settlement Agreement)

B:

"Stipulation" allowing return of property
(attached to Settlement Agreement)

C:

"Stipulation" Dismissing Protective Orders
(attached to Settlement Agreement)

D.

Defendant's Reply to Motion to Set Aside Stipulation & Order

E.

Reply Memorandum - Plaintiff

F.

Notice to Submit for Decision

G.

Order to Deny Motion to Set Aside Stipulation & Order

I.

Notice of Appeal

